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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round negotiations at the
Marrakesh ministerial meeting on April 15, 1994, the United States
signed the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (Marrakesh Agreement).1 There, the United States doubled
down on its commitment to accelerate economic growth through the
promotion of free trade.2 Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Treaty, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(T.R.I.P.S.), further provided a baseline, from which member countries
could protect owners of intellectual property (I.P.).3 Before T.R.I.P.S.,
enforcement of I.P. rights was relegated to general obligations to provide
for legal remedies, mostly left to national legislation.4
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 155.
2. See Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994 ¶ 16, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 148
(“[C]onclusion of the round [would] strengthen the world economy and lead to more
trade, investment, employment, and income growth throughout the world.”).
3. See General Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property art.
1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 321 [hereinafter TRIPS] (“Members may, but shall not be
obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement.”).
4. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 440 (3d ed. 2008) (touting the enforcement section of TRIPS as “clearly one
of the major achievements of the negotiation”).
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The Trademark Dilution Revision Act (T.D.R.A.) of 20065 broadly
expanded the rights conferred on owners of well-known marks.6 The
amorphous law gives U.S. courts unfettered discretion to provide senior
mark owners with unlimited rights, essentially foreclosing the movement
and access of goods and services in violation of T.R.I.P.S. Article 41.1.7
In Part II, this paper will discuss how the United States became a
member of the World Trade Organization (W.T.O.).8 This includes the
rights and obligations conferred by the main treaty and its annexes
through the U.S. signing of the Marrakesh Agreement.9 Part II will give
a history of the drafting of T.R.I.P.S. as well as a legal history of Art. 41.1
of T.R.I.P.S.10 Part II also introduces the single complaint to go to the
W.T.O. Dispute Settlement Body (D.S.B.), invoking Art. 41.1 and its
significance.11 It will then explore the history and subsequent rise of the
federal anti-dilution law in the United States and examine two U.S. cases
as examples of the inconsistent application of the anti-dilution law.12
Part III will analyze U.S. obligations as a member of the W.T.O.13 The
analysis will discuss T.R.I.P.S. Art. 41.1 and interpret the key terms in
T.R.I.P.S. pursuant to the Vienna Convention Law of Treaties
(V.C.L.T.), defining and applying them to the enforcement of anti-
dilution law in the United States.14 The analysis concludes with a
discussion of cases in the United States and how the inconsistent
application of anti-dilution law violates T.R.I.P.S. Art. 41.1 by creating a
non-tariff trade barrier to legitimate trade through the unnecessary
expansion of protection for well-known marks.15
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (West 2017).
6. See Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused about the Trademark Dilution
Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1179 (2006) (noting that the
relevant factors required to determine dilution by blurring neither require “heightened
creativity nor identity in the defendant’s use”).
7. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 41 (requiring procedures to “be applied in such a
manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for
safeguards against their abuse”).
8. Infra Part II(a).
9. Infra Part II(a).
10. Infra Part II(b).
11. Infra Part II(b).
12. Infra Part II(c).
13. Infra Part III(a).
14. Infra Part III(b).
15. Infra Part III(c).
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Part IV provides recommendations for squaring anti-dilution law with
international obligations.16 First, the United States Congress can repeal
the federal anti-dilution statute or otherwise take steps to ensure uniform
application of the law across the nation.17 Second, the United States can
take measures to protect well-known marks in accord with international
provisions under the likelihood of confusion test, obviating the need for
an anti-dilution law.18 Third, parties may bring action against the United
States for violation of Art. 41.1 of T.R.I.P.S. by utilizing the D.S.B.19
Finally, Part V concludes that unless the United States reforms or
repeals its anti-dilution law, it is in direct violation of T.R.I.P.S. Art.
41.1.20
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides information on the creation of the W.T.O.,
T.R.I.P.S., and the advent of anti-dilution law in the United States. It
discusses the agreements that together established the W.T.O. and
created the international law for trade in goods, services, and I.P. It
introduces a complaint that came before the W.T.O. invoking Art. 41.1
of T.R.I.P.S. and discusses how the D.S.B. has treated that provision in
other complaints that cited Art. 41. It further discusses the intention of
the drafters of T.R.I.P.S., as well as how the D.S.B. has defined terms
such as “legitimate” and “trade.” The discussion of the anti-dilution law
includes its original intention and evolution, and it includes how anti-
dilution law interacts with the traditional test for trademark infringement:
the likelihood of confusion test. This section will also introduce two
cases in the United States that demonstrate the reach of anti-dilution law.
A. ONE TREATY TO RULE THEMALL: THE ROAD TO THEWORLD
TRADEORGANIZATION
In 1944, forty-four Allied nations convened in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire to draft the Bretton Woods Agreement.21 Recognizing the
16. Infra Part IV.
17. Infra Part IV(a).
18. Infra Part IV(b).
19. Infra Part IV(c).
20. Infra Part V.
21. EDWARD M. BERNSTEIN ET AL., THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 13-14 (Orin Kirshner ed. 1996)
2020] STATE OF DILUTION 371
need to rebuild the international economic system in the wake of World
War II, they agreed upon the creation of a trilateral system consisting of
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International
Trade Organization (I.T.O.).22 The U.S. Congress refused to ratify the
I.T.O., citing that it gave too much power to an international entity over
domestic governance.23 The conference members intended for the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), the original
agreement dealing with trade in goods and brainchild of Julio LaCarte-
Muro,24 to be a chapter under the I.T.O.25 Since the members did not
create the I.T.O., they only provisionally implemented the now-defunct
1947 version of the G.A.T.T.26
The Uruguay Round of negotiations, spanning nine years between
1986-1994 – and met with the fall of the Berlin Wall, Marxism, and
Communism - heralded a new era of regulated trade.27 With the United
States in the lead, negotiations concluded with the Marrakesh
Agreement, which included the creation of the W.T.O., adoption of a
new version of the G.A.T.T., and inclusion of agreements on trade in
services28 and I.P.29 for the first time.30 The two main goals of the system
(“Some 730 persons attended the conference . . . represent[ing] forty-four countries,
most of the Allies of World War II.”).
22. Id. at 83.
23. Id. at 85-86.
24. See Julio Lacarte-Muro, ‘Dean’ of GATT, Dies at 97, WORLD-GRAIN (March 8,
2016), https://www.world-grain.com/articles/6249-julio-lacarte-muro-dean-of-gatt-
dies-at-97 (outlining his influence over and various positions he held within the GATT
since its inception).





27. See BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 21, at vii (“We convened the Bretton Woods
Revisited conference to educate ourselves and others about . . . a new generation of
global problems[.]”) (emphasis original).
28. See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 283
[hereinafter GATS].
29. See generally TRIPS, supra note 3, at 319.
30. See History of the Multilateral Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm (last visited June 10,
2019) (describing theWTO’s creation as “the biggest reform of international trade since
the end of the Second World War”).
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at its inception were market access through progressive liberalization31
and non-discrimination against imports.32 In each of the annexes to the
Marrakesh Agreement,33 as well as in the Marrakesh Declaration,34
members reaffirmed their commitment to the liberalization of trade to
eliminate barriers, while respecting sustainable development, optimal use
of resources, the environment, people, and creating a mechanism of
redress.35
TheMarrakesh Agreement and its annexes recognized that eliminating
tariffs was an essential feature of liberalizing trade but also included
provisions for non-tariff barriers, or NTBs.36 The Organization for
31. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (removing tariffs and quotas under Article 2 and non-
tariff barriers under Article 11).
32. See id. art. 1 (reiterating the Most Favored Nation requirement: “[A]ny
advantage . . . granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties”);
id. art. 3 (reiterating the National Treatment requirement: “The products of the territory
of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
be accorded treatment no less favourable [sic] than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use”).
33. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 31, pmbl (recognizing economic growth through
“reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements”); GATS, supra note 28, pmbl
(“Recognizing growing importance of trade in services for the growth and development
of the world economy[.]”); TRIPS, supra note 3, at 320 (“Desiring to reduce distortions
and impediments to international trade . . . [while ensuring] that measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade.”).
34. See, e.g., Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to
Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking ¶ 1, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
45 [hereinafter Marrakesh Contribution Declaration] (recognizing that liberal trading
policies contribute to the healthy growth and development of member countries’
economies as well the world economy as a whole).
35. See What is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited
June 10, 2019) (asserting that the WTO is “an organization for liberalizing trade” and
“a place where member governments go to try to sort out the trade problems they face
with each other”).
36. See Non-tariff Barriers: Red Tape, etc., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm9_e.htm (last visited
June 10, 2019) [hereinafter Non-Tariff Barriers] (providing a list of agreements that deal
with various bureaucratic or legal issues that could involve hindrances to trade).
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Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) describes how
these “behind-the-border issues,” whether policy measures other than
tariffs or tariff-rate quotas, directly impact international trade, which can
affect prices, quantities, or both.37
B. THEAGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATEDASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: TRIPPING THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL I.P. LAW
With the Uruguay Round of negotiations pushing toward more
liberalized trading policies and recognition of economic importance of
trade as it related to areas other than goods came the inclusion of
agreements on trade in services and I.P.38 The structure of the current
T.R.I.P.S. agreement took nearly six years to draft with T.R.I.P.S.
becoming binding on each member of the W.T.O. as Annex 1C of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization on
April 15, 1994.39
As a multilateral agreement on I.P. under the W.T.O., T.R.I.P.S.
operates under the umbrella of the Marrakesh Agreement.40
Furthermore, T.R.I.P.S. is categorized by the main areas of I.P. rights,
establishing baseline standards of protection for each, as well as rules for
administration and enforcement and application of the D.S.B. to resolve
disputes between W.T.O. members.41
Under T.R.I.P.S., trademarks occupy seven articles which outline
protections that members must make available for trademarks.42 Article
16 governs rights conferred, with Art. 16.1 calling only for a likelihood
37. Non-tariff Measures, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/non-tariff-measures/ (last
visited June 22, 2019).
38. See INTELL. PROP. DIV., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A HANDBOOK ON
THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT 4-5 (Anthony Taubman et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION] (explaining that the main purpose of this push for
the inclusion of IP was to even the playing field by protecting the main IP-exporting
countries).
39. Cf. id. at 7-8.
40. See id. at 8-10 (“ . . . the very comprehensive nature of TRIPS as the only
multilateral treaty which covers essentially all relevant IP rights . . .”).
41. Id.
42. See TRIPS, supra note 3, arts. 15–22.
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of confusion test.43 Arts. 16.2 and 16.3 incorporate Art. 6bis of the Paris
Convention.44 Specifically, the articles outline a provision for well-known
marks, and a provision applying protection to goods and services, which
are dissimilar for those of the senior mark.45
Article 41 of T.R.I.P.S. governs the general obligations of members
when enforcing I.P. rights.46 Notably, Art. 41.1 seeks to find a balance
between effective action against infringement of I.P. rights while
avoiding barriers to legitimate trade.47 While the D.S.B. has heard forty-
one cases citing T.R.I.P.S. in the request for consultations, only once has
a member invoked Art. 41.1 to seek redress against barriers to legitimate
trade.48 The complaint, lodged by India and Brazil against the European
Union and joined by Canada, China, Ecuador, Japan, and Turkey, was
settled without going to a panel on July 2011.49
C. DILUTION, WELL-KNOWNMARKS, AND THE STRANGE
UNDOING OF CONFUSION-BASED TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Courts usually ask one question when determining whether there is
43. See id. art. 16(1) (“The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive
right to prevent . . . [the use of] . . . identical or similar signs for goods or services which
are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where
such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.”).
44. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, as revised
at the Stockholm Revision Conference, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (“[C]ountries of the Union undertake . . . to refuse
or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes
a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark
considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well
known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of
this Convention and used for identical or similar goods.”).
45. See TRIPS, supra note 3, arts. 16(2)–(3).
46. See id. art. 41; see also, GERVAIS, supra note 4, at 441 (noting the enforcement
section as of particular importance to the entirety of the agreement).
47. SeeWORLDTRADEORGANIZATION, supra note 38, at 139 (requiring procedures
to be fair and equitable, decisions to be made on the merits of the case, and for there
to be opportunity for review).
48. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State –
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter
Request for Consultations by India] (alleging that “the measures at issue, inter alia,
create barriers to legitimate trade”).
49. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce & Indus., India E.U. Reach an
Understanding on Issue of Seizure of Indian Generic Drugs in Transit (July 28, 2011),
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=73554.
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infringement under the federal trademark statute; was the consumer
confused or likely to be confused?50 Specifically, the likelihood of
confusion test examines whether the defendant’s use is likely to cause
confusion, mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of the user with the senior user.51
Frank Schechter introduced the concept of dilution in his oft-cited
1927 Harvard Law Review article.52 Schechter noted the traditional
function of trademark law in accord with the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,53 the leading case for
trademark law at the time.54 Schechter argued that trademark law
jurisprudence, which seemed to focus on source or origin, did not usually
protect marks on non-competing goods unless (1) there was a likelihood
of confusion for the consumer or (2) the infringing mark tarnished the
reputation and value of the senior mark.55 Therefore, Schechter
50. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:1 (5th ed. 2019) [hereinafter MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION I]; see also BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN-
SOURCE CASEBOOK 366 (5th ed. 2018); Farley, supra note 6, at 1175-76 (highlighting
the relevant factors in determining dilution, neither being creativity or identity related).
Compare Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that
defendant’s use of “Virgin Wireless” infringed on plaintiff’s rights in the registered
trademark “Virgin” because the use would inevitably have a high likelihood of causing
consumer confusion), with Hero Nutritionals LLC v. Nutraceutical Corp., No. SACV 11-
1195, 2013 WL 4480674, at *1, *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013) (finding that two product
lines of children’s vitamins were not confusingly similar because the marks were not
similar enough to cause confusion, did not cause actual confusion, and a purchaser
exercising care would not be confused by the two products).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (West 2017) (registered marks); 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A) (West 2017) (unregistered marks); see also, Virgin Enter. Ltd., 335 F.3d at
149 (finding that use of the well-known senior “Virgin” mark by the junior “Virgin
Wireless” user in connection with stores selling reasonably related merchandise would
inevitably lead to consumer confusion regarding the source of the merchandise in the
junior user’s store).
52. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 801 (1997) (citing Frank Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARVARD L. REV. 813 (1927)).
53. 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916) (holding that a party is permitted to use a mark in a
specific geographic area, even if another party used the mark in a different geographic
area) (superseded by Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park And Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985)).
54. Frank I. Schechter, THE RATIONAL BASIS OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813, 813-14 (1927) (quoting the definition provided by the Court as “to
identify the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed”).
55. See id. at 821 (stating that “the process has been one of making exceptions rather
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concluded, trademark law required a mechanism to protect creation and
retention of custom over the designation of the source.56 Using a 1924
German case57 to drive his point home, Schechter identified four
emerging principles necessitating protection for dissimilar goods or
services beyond a likelihood of confusion test.58
In the United States, the Lanham Act of 1946, codified in Chapter 22
of Title 15, Commerce and Trade, of the U.S. Code, governs dilution of
well-known trademarks.59 Through its many permutations, Congress has
arguably broadened the scope of anti-infringement protection in the
Lanham Act but none so significantly as the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act (F.T.D.A.) of 1996, which established a federal cause of action for
anti-dilution protection, and the F.T.D.A.’s replacement, the T.D.R.A.60
The T.D.R.A. rewrote §1125(c) to include what constituted a well-known
mark,61 the definition of dilution by blurring and relevant factors to
consider in determining whether such dilution occurred,62 and the
than of frank recognition of the true basis of trademark protection”).
56. Id. at 822 (introducing “preservation of the uniqueness or individuality of the
trademark” as one of the most important aspects to its owner).
57. Odol Case, 1924, 25 JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 502.
58. See Schechter, supra note 54, at 830-31 (noting that (1) the modern value of
trademark is its selling power, (2) this selling power depends for its psychological hold
upon the public its uniqueness and singularity, (3) such uniqueness or singularity is
impaired equally regardless of whether the goods are related or dissimilar, and (4) the
degree of protection depends upon the extent to which the mark is actually unique).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (West 2017).
60. See BEEBE, supra note 50, at 21 (outlining the timeline of amendments to the
Lanham Act).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (West 2017) (“(i) The duration, extent, and
geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or
publicized by the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual
recognition of the mark.”).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (West 2017) (“[A]ssociation arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of
the famous mark . . . (i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and
the famous mark. (ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous
mark. (iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark. (iv) The degree of recognition of the famous
mark. (v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association
with the famous mark. (vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and
the famous mark.”).
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definition of dilution by tarnishment.63
D. FAR ANDWIDE: ANTI-DILUTION LAW IN PRACTICE
Two cases illustrate the application of anti-dilution law following the
implementation of the T.D.R.A. In Visa International Ass’n v. JSL Corp.,64
Visa International, the credit card company, sued the defendant, who ran
an online business providing language education, on the claim that the
junior mark was likely to dilute the senior mark.65 The Ninth Circuit
Court held that the defendant’s use of “eVisa” and “eVisa.com” was
likely to cause dilution by blurring.66 The fame and distinctiveness of the
credit card company’s mark were uncontested.67 The court reasoned that
the introduction of eVisa into the marketplace meant that two products,
not just one, would be competing for association with the word “visa.”68
In Cottonwood Financial Ltd. v. Cash Store Financial Services, Inc.,69 the
plaintiff, a Texas lending center, sued the defendant, a Canadian lending
center, for dilution under Texas law because of the defendant’s use of
the term “cash store.”70 Although not invoking anti-dilution under
federal law, the court defined the Texas anti-dilution statute71 and
construed the law in accord with the T.D.R.A., as well as New York
State’s anti-dilution law’s six “Sweet” factors,72 and the likelihood of
confusion factors in its likelihood of dilution analysis.73 On balance, the
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (West 2017) (“association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the
famous mark”).
64. 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010).
65. Id. at 1089.
66. Id. at 1092 (“[M]ultiplication of meanings is the essence of dilution by
blurring.”).
67. Id. at 1090.
68. See id. at 1091-92 (noting that the defendant’s use created “a novel meaning for
the word” beyond referral to travel visa).
69. 778 F. Supp. 2d 726 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
70. Id. at 730.
71. See id. at 742 (noting that the Texas statue broadens the federal provisions since
a party invoking Texas law need not show fame).
72. Id. at 745-46 (“1) similarity of the marks, 2) similarity of the products covered
by the marks, 3) sophistication of consumers, 4) predatory intent, 5) renown of the
senior mark, and 6) renown of the junior mark.”).
73. Id. at 749 (settling on eight factors to evaluate: “(1) the degree of similarity
between the allegedly diluting mark or trade name and the distinctive mark; (2) the
degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the distinctive mark; (3) the extent to
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court found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury because the
use of “cash store” by the defendant would dilute the plaintiff’s mark in
the United States.74 The court enjoined the defendant from referring to
itself as “cash store” or “the cash store” and required that the defendant
include “a conspicuous disclaimer of its lack of affiliation” with the
plaintiff.75
III. ANALYSIS
The first section explains the U.S. legal responsibility as a member of
the W.T.O. This includes a brief discussion on the binding legality of
treaty provisions under the V.C.L.T. and the U.S. intention following the
Uruguay Rounds as signified in U.S. reports and actions after the signing
of the Marrakesh Agreement. This section further argues that the United
States is not fulfilling those obligations. The second section explains Art.
41.1 of T.R.I.P.S. and analyzes meaning of the provision pursuant to the
V.C.L.T. The final section examines two cases in the United States and
describes how the application of anti-dilution law violates international
law.
A. MUCHOBLIGED: THEU.S. LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY AS AMEMBER
OF THEW.T.O.
When the United States signed the Marrakesh Agreement, it did not
establish consent to be bound because the signature is subject to
ratification.76 However, the signature is a means of authentication and
expresses the willingness of the signatory state to proceed with
acceptance or approval and refrain from acts that would defeat the
which the owner of the distinctive mark engages in substantially exclusive use of the
mark; (4) the degree of recognition of the distinctive mark; (5) whether the user of the
allegedly diluting mark or trade name intended to create an association with the
distinctive mark; (6) any actual or potential association between the allegedly diluting
mark or trade name and the distinctive mark; (7) the similarity of the products or
services between users; and (8) the sophistication of consumers.”).
74. See id. at 759 (finding that the “cash store” marks are distinctive and therefore
the defendant’s use not only lessens the plaintiff’s “mark’s capacity to identify the true
owner’s goods”, but also places two products in the marketplace “competing for
association with that term”).
75. Id. at 761.
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 10, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [herein after VCLT].
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objective of the treaty.77 The signature expressed a willingness “to
submit . . . the W.T.O. Agreement for the consideration of [its]
respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement . . . and adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.”78
While the United States did not ratify the Marrakesh Agreement and
its annexes as treaties,79 it did implement them through legislation and
administrative action.80 The subsequent expansion of the scope and task
of the Office of the United States Trade Representative confirms what
was, at the time, the United States’ desire to reap not only the benefits of
the Marrakesh Agreement and its annexes but also fulfill its obligations
under them.81
The United States is required, by its law, to answer Requests for
Consultations (i.e., complaints) concerning whether one of its laws is
inconsistent with its W.T.O. obligations.82 As such, it may be liable for
redress under the D.S.B. if it fails to comply with its obligations.83 Indeed,
the United States has already been the respondent in four disputes
brought to the W.T.O. under T.R.I.P.S.84 Although not necessarily the
77. Id. art. 18.
78. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations ¶ 2, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14.
79. See VCLT, supra note 76, arts. 2(1)(b), 14(1), 16 (defining ratification as the
international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty).
80. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub.L. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); see
also, JOHN H. JACKSON & ALAN O. SYKES, IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND
238-40 (1997) (clarifying that should the U.S. fail in implementation, there are no
particular consequences).
81. History of the United States Trade Representative, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/history (last visited July 24,
2019) (noting that passage of the law galvanized the USTR’s efforts to implement and
enforce U.S. trade agreements more than ever before).
82. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3533(d)(1)-(3) (West 2017).
83. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
84. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States — Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, WTO
Doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000); Panel Report, United States — Section 211
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/R (adopted Aug. 6, 2001);
Request for Consultation by the European Communities, United States — Section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 and Amendments Thereto, WTO Doc. WT/DS186/1 (received Jan.
18, 2000); Request for Consultation by Brazil, United States — US Patents Code, WTO
Doc. WT/DS224/1 (received July 23, 2001).
380 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [35:2
herald of free trade, the W.T.O. drives trade regulation through
negotiations, providing legal ground rules to ensure fluidity, and most
importantly, eliminating barriers.85 If a member state impedes another
member state’s ability to trade, the states answer to one another at the
D.S.B.86
The United States itself recognized that, initially, eliminating barriers
meant reducing tariffs.87 However, NTBs, barriers that restrict imports
or exports of goods or services, although less transparent than traditional
tariffs, can be equally, if not more, effective in hindering free trade.88
Recognizing this, members ensured that the W.T.O. agreements cover
the legal issues that could involve NTB hindrances to trade.89 The
O.E.C.D. refers to NTBs as non-tariff measures (NTMs) and broadly
divides them into two categories.90 However, over-protection of
trademarks does not fit neatly into any of the categories noted above, but
when viewed in the context of international trade, anti-dilution law
operates as a domestic regulation cum non-technical barrier to trade.91
85. See What is the World Trade Organization?, supra note 35.
86. See DSU, supra note 83, arts. 3(1), 3(3).
87. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-94-83B, THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE - URUGUAY ROUND FINAL ACT SHOULD
PRODUCE OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC GAINS 14 (1994) [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-94-83B] (reviewing, at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round, the GATT objectives in order to report to Congress that the results of the
negotiation “could produce overall economic gains for the United States”).
88. See Welcome to the NTM Hub, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/Trade-Analysis/Non-Tariff-
Measures.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).
89. See Non-Tariff Barriers, supra note 36 (listing import licensing, rules for valuation
of goods at customs, pre-shipment inspections, rules of origin, and trade prepared
investment measures).
90. See Non-Tariff Measures, supra note 37 (defining “technical measures, [which]
include[] regulations, standards, testing and certification, primarily sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures, and non-technical
measures[,] . . . [or] quantitative restrictions to include quantitative restrictions (quotas,
non-automatic import licensing), price measures, forced logistics or distribution
channels.”).
91. See id. (emphasizing that different standards raise costs for businesses seeking
access to more than one market).
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B. T.R.I.P.S. ARTICLE 41.1: ENFORCEMENT, BARRIERS, LEGITIMATE
TRADE
Article 41.1 of T.R.I.P.S. states:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part
are available under their law to permit effective action against any act of
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which
constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be
applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.92
The question that this Comment contemplates is whether Art. 41.1
has any application to substantive legal standards that invite inconsistent
interpretation by enforcement authorities. This section argues that it can.
Article 41.1 should be read to prohibit new I.P. rights protections that
are so amorphous that they do not effectively restrain enforcement
decision-making.
Discussion is often limited to the first sentence of the provision.93 This
limited attention is not surprising considering that of the forty-one
dispute settlements brought to the W.T.O. over alleged T.R.I.P.S.
violations, only four cited Art. 41.1.94 The majority of those used Art.
92. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 41.
93. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski,Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS
Implementation in India ‘s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1609 (2009) (focusing
on the TRIPS requirement of effectiveness and fairness of enforcement); Rochelle
Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 573 (2015) (highlighting
“‘effective enforcement’ and ‘fair and equitable procedures’”); Jayashree Watal, U.S.-
China Intellectual Property Dispute - A Comment on the Interpretation of the TRIPS Enforcement
Provisions, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 605,
606-07 (2010) (quoting only the first sentence of the provision).
94. See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities —
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs,
WTO Doc. WT/DS174/1 (June 1, 1999); Request for Consultations by the United
States, China — Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WTO Doc. WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by
the United States, Measures Affecting Intellectual Property Rights]; Request for Consultations
by Brazil, European Union and a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO
Doc. WT/DS409/1 (May 12, 2010) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by Brazil,
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit]; Request for Consultations by Qatar, Saudi Arabia —
Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS567/1
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41.1 as an afterthought: a catch-all to claim ineffective enforcement
procedures in the offending country that in turn deprived the claimant
of proper protection under T.R.I.P.S.95
Only once in the history of T.R.I.P.S. has a country directly invoked
Art. 41.1’s second sentence.96 In December 2008, Dutch authorities
seized a shipment of the generic drug Losartan Potassium produced in
India and destined to Brazil while it was in transit at Schiphol Airport in
the Netherlands.97 Acting pursuant to European Communities (E.C.)
Regulation Number 1383/2003, which provides for customs actions
against goods suspected of infringing I.P. rights, the authorities sent the
shipment back to the country of origin.98 This dispute, which was joined
by Canada, China, Ecuador, Japan, and Turkey, was settled without going
to a panel in July 2011.99 So, Art. 41.1’s provision on the creation of
barriers never got its day in court.100
Observers have noted that T.R.I.P.S. set out minimum standards later
met by the ratcheting up of I.P. protection by independent nations.101
However, the T.R.I.P.S. Preamble itself emphasizes a need to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce I.P. rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade.102
(Oct. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by Qatar].
95. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WTO Doc.
WT/DS174/R (adoptedMarch 15, 2005) (claiming a regulation is inconsistent with Art.
41.1 because it does not provide requisite enforcement procedures and remedies);
Request for Consultations by the United States, Measures Affecting Intellectual Property
Rights, supra note 94 (citing failure to make enforcement procedures available); Request
for Consultations by Qatar, supra note 94 (citing failure to ensure that enforcement
procedures are available).
96. See Request for Consultations by India, supra note 48.
97. See Request for Consultations by Brazil, Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, supra
note 94.
98. Id.
99. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce & Indus., supra note 49.
100. Id. (noting the EU’s “willingness to resolve the dispute without resorting to the
WTO dispute panel”).
101. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Time for a Paradigm Shift: Exploring Maximum
Standards in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 TRADE L. & DEV. 56, 58 (2009)
[hereinafter Ruse-Khan, Time for a Paradigm Shift] (“ . . . [TRIPS] create a ‘floor’
consisting of a minimum level of protection . . . with presumably the sky being the only
limit as to further extension of IP protection.”).
102. TRIPS, supra note 3, pmbl.
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This one-way ratcheting up of I.P. protection is problematic for two
reasons. First, as noted in the complaints by Brazil and India, it is not
only inconsistent with obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement, but,
in the case of the seizure of generic medicines, it severely impacted the
ability of developing and least-developed countries to protect public
health and provide access to medicine.103 This matter is emblematic of
the secondary and tertiary effects of over-protecting I.P.104 Enter the
second clause of Art. 41.1; where the first clause protects rights holders
with the cloak of minimum T.R.I.P.S. standards, the second, a safeguard
for free-trade, should protect users against T.R.I.P.S.-plus laws that
distort or create barriers to legitimate trade.105
Second, T.R.I.P.S. itself contemplates the need for balance between
effective and adequate protection of I.P. rights and ensuring that those
measures do not impede trade.106 Article 41.1 reiterates the emphasis on
balance-this time between enforcement measures and their impediments
to trade.107
The V.C.L.T. provides general rules of interpretation that aid in
understanding Art. 41.1. Article 41.1 must be interpreted according to
the basic principle that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”108 The
context in which the treaty terms are read include, among other things,
103. See Request for Consultations by Brazil, Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, supra
note 94; see also Request for Consultations by India, supra note 48.
104. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to International
Trade: ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 645, 697
(2011) [hereinafter Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to International Trade]
(noting that “no Panel or Appellate Body has addressed the interpretation of the
relevant parts of TRIPS Article 41.(1)”).
105. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 41; cf. Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to
International Trade, supra note 104, at 655-58 (noting “the incorporation of TRIPS into
the WTO multilateral trading system” and that minimal, as well as excessive, reliance
on IP protection can distort or create barriers to trade).
106. See TRIPS, supra note 3, pmbl (beginning the preamble with “[d]esiring to
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade”); cf. Ruse-Khan, Time for a
Paradigm Shift, supra note 101, at 92 (advocating for “ceilings” or maximum standards
within the International IP system).
107. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 41.
108. See VCLT, supra note 76, art. 31(1).
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the preamble to the treaty.109 Articles 7 and 8 in T.R.I.P.S. outline the
objectives and purposes of the treaty: a balanced approach to I.P.
protection, considering the interests of both producers and users and the
adoption of measures to prevent the abuse of I.P. rights, in accordance
with the other provisions in T.R.I.P.S.110 Three basic terms,
“enforcement procedures,” “barriers,” and “legitimate trade” are
examined further to understand how Art. 41.1 should be interpreted.
1. Words Mean Things: Enforcement Procedures
Article 41.1 applies only to “enforcement procedures as specified in
this Part.”111 The drafters are referring to Part III, “Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights,” which outlines enforcement procedures
that members must make available over five sections and twenty-one
articles.112 The general obligations found under Art. 41 apply to all judicial
and administrative enforcement procedures specified in Part III.113
The ordinary meaning of enforcement is the act of compelling
observance of or compliance with a law, rule, or obligation.114 Procedure
is the established or official way of doing something.115 “Enforcement
procedures,” as they are proposed in T.R.I.P.S., are required to enable
rights holders to take effective action against infringement of their I.P.
rights.116 The objective is to permit effective action against infringement
of I.P. rights while ensuring principles of due process are met.117 A judge
in a United States court is usually a public official appointed or elected
to hear and decide legal matters in court.118 Cottonwood and Visa
109. Id. art. 31(2).
110. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 7; see also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note
38, at 13.
111. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 41.
112. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 38, at 135.
113. Id. at 138; see also TRIPS, supra note 3, arts. 42-46 (defining fair and equitable
procedures, rules on evidence, resulting remedies, and damages).
114. Enforcement, LEXICO https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/enforcement (last
visited Sept. 13, 2019).
115. Procedure, LEXICO https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/procedure (last
visited Sept. 13, 2019).
116. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 38, at 139.
117. See id. at 138-40 (noting that Articles 41.2, fair and equitable procedures; 41.3,
decisions on the merits of the case; and 41.3, opportunity for review are the basic
principles of due process according to TRIPS).
118. Judge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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International are examples of the established way of litigating disputes in
the United States.119 Therefore, anti-dilution litigation as it occurs in U.S.
courts is an enforcement procedure in the context of T.R.I.P.S.
2. Words Mean Things: Barriers
The drafters included crucial language in the second sentence of Art.
41.1: “these procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid
creation of barriers to legitimate trade,” a sentiment and standard echoed
throughout W.T.O.’s agreements.120
The W.T.O. traditionally defined barriers as tariffs.121 However, the
W.T.O. and other international organizations quickly recognized that
NTB’s could create as much, if not a worse, impediment to trade.122
Barriers, then, in the context of T.R.I.P.S. are any obstacles, economic or
otherwise, that prevent movement or access.123 This definition should be
read to include the application of amorphous substantive laws when they
foreclose the movement and access of goods and services.
3. Words Mean Things: Legitimate Trade
A W.T.O. panel report, supported by the International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development (I.C.T.S.D.) and United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.), defined
“legitimate,” as part of the phrase “legitimate interest,” as “a normative
119. See generally Cottonwood Fin. Ltd. v. Cash Store Fin. Serv., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 726
(N.D. Tex. 2011) (identifying case as a civil litigation dispute); Visa Int’l Ass’n v. JSL
Corp., 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (identifying case as a civil litigation dispute); Tai-
Heng Cheng & Christopher Cook, Litigation & Enforcement in the United States: Overview,
WESTLAW PRACTICAL LAW DISPUTE RESOLUTION GLOBAL GUIDE (2019),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I020653f01cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee
/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=
true&bhcp=1 (“The basic framework for litigation is consistent throughout the US and
typically commences when an aggrieved party (the plaintiff) files an action against
another party allegedly responsible for the injury (the defendant).”).
120. See GERVAIS, supra note 4, at 441 (citing GATT art. XXIV, “[T]he purpose of a
customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade . . . not raise barriers”;
GATT art. XX, “[S]uch measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute . . . a disguised restriction on international trade[.]”).
121. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-94-83B, supra note 87, at 14.
122. See Non-Tariff Barriers, supra note 36; see also Non-Tariff Measures, supra note 37.
123. Barrier, LEXICO https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/barrier (last visited on Sept.
13, 2019).
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claim calling for protection of interests that are justifiable in the sense
that they are supported by relevant public policies or other social
norms.”124 Ruse-Khan suggests that this normative approach is
supported in the literature that views Art. 41.1 as an expression of the
need for the balance of the tension between rights holders and
infringers:125 any trade driven by public policy or interest or supported by
social norms generally under Art. 41.1.
The ordinary meaning of legitimate is conforming to the law or to
rules.126 Trade is the action of buying and selling goods and services.127
Read together with Ruse-Khan’s reasoning, in light of the T.R.I.P.S.
Preamble and Arts. 7 and 8 of T.R.I.P.S., legitimate trade should be
understood as the exchange of goods or services that follows the rules
and promotes the public good. The defendants in Cottonwood operated a
business engaged in short-term payday consumer lending.128 The
defendant in Visa International operated a multilingual education and
information business on the internet.129 Both businesses were involved
in legitimate trade as it is defined within the context of T.R.I.P.S.
Taken together, the best interpretation of Art. 41.1 is that the
inconsistent application of substantive law is an enforcement measure
that creates a barrier to legitimate trade. The amorphous nature of anti-
dilution law gives U.S. courts unbounded discretion to find ever-
increasing trademark rights therefore creating a barrier which forecloses
the trade of goods and services. The Visa International and Cottonwood
decisions are enforcement procedures that, when applied, create barriers
to legitimate trade that Art. 41.1 expressly forbids.
124. See Ruse-Khan,ATrade Agreement Creating Barriers to International Trade, supra note
104, at 697 (detailing the WTO Panel’s definition of “legitimate” in Canada
Pharmaceutical Products).
125. Id.
126. Legitimate, LEXICO https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/legitimate (last
visited on Sept 13, 2019).
127. Trade, LEXICO https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/trade (last visited on
Sept. 13, 2019).
128. Cottonwood Fin. Ltd. v. Cash Store Fin. Serv., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (N.D.
Tex. 2011).
129. Visa Int’l Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010).
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C. STRAYVOLTAGE: THE INCONSISTENTAPPLICATION OFANTI-
DILUTION LAW IN THEUNITED STATES
U.S. courts have struggled with the concept of dilution since its
inception.130 To analyze whether dilution by blurring occurs, courts
essentially weigh the imagination cost on the minds of consumers.131
When this results in enjoining a foreign business from operating in the
United States, courts essentially ignore international obligations.132
Schechter’s original intent for anti-dilution was to give plaintiffs an
opportunity to (1) protect highly unusual marks, (2) where the goods of
services were dissimilar, and (3) the defendant duplicated the mark
exactly.133 The expansion of anti-dilution through F.T.D.A. and
subsequently the T.D.R.A. dismissed the evolution of trademark law,
plaintiffs’ general success in litigation, and globalization in general.134
What was meant to be a consumer protection provision evolved into an
in gross property right for owners, threatening the liberalized trade
130. See Farley, supra note 6, at 1176-77 (citing the court in Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Circus Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d. 449, 451 (4th Cir.
1999), which calls dilution “dauntingly elusive” and references the Supreme Court’s
overriding effort to understand dilution during oral arguments in a dilution case).
131. See BEEBE, supra note 50, at 473 (quoting Judge Posner in Ty Inc. v. Perryman,
306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002), “[C]onsumers will have to think harder—incur as it were
a higher imagination cost—to recognize the name as the name of the store. So
“blurring” is one form of dilution.”); see also Farley, supra note 6, at 1183 (“It sounds like
what is being sought by the trademark bar is statutorily enforced mind control.”).
132. Compare Paris Convention, supra note 44, art. 10bis(2) (noting, generally, the
prohibition on “[a]ny act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition”) and TRIPS, supra note 3,
art. 41 (directing members “to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade”), with
Cottonwood, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (enjoining Canadian defendant from referring to itself
in a way that dilutes the American plaintiff’s trademark and further requiring the
Canadian defendant to include disclaimers disassociating itself from the American
plaintiff).
133. See Farley, supra note 6, at 1179 (stating that such restrictions were necessary
“because trademark owners could not win a trademark infringement case where a
defendant used their mark on drastically different goods or services”); see also
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION I, supra note 50, § 24:68
(detailing further Schechter’s law review proposals).
134. See Farley, supra note 6, at 1180 (highlighting that rights owners were largely
successful in enjoining uses of their marks before the enactment of federal dilution
statutes as a result of maximum exploitation of brands and the closing of the gap in
protection for dissimilar goods or services).
388 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [35:2
obligations the United States signed on to as a member of the W.T.O.135
The court in Cottonwood, which notably relied on Texas anti-dilution
law,136 itself admits the trouble with dilution law in general.137 In coming
to its conclusion, the court reasoned that the American plaintiff owned
a distinctive descriptive mark in the phrase “cash store” because it
obtained an incontestable status for various iterations of the mark,
therefore obtaining a coveted secondary meaning for trademark
protection purposes.138 The court ordered the Canadian defendant,
which operated lending stores offering similar services to those of the
American defendant in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom for
ten years under the trade name “the cash store,” to cease calling itself
“cash store” or “the cash store” in its regulatory filings, communications,
and investment solicitation activities directed at investors, analysts, or
consumers in the United States.139 The court further required the
Canadian defendant to include disclaimers when engaged in the activities
mentioned above.140
The court’s reasoning and holding in Cottonwood are emblematic of the
anti-trade and anti-competitive nature of dilution law in general.
Remarkably, this case did not even use the T.D.R.A. to reach its
conclusion, but rather a state statute that further expands the protection
135. See Klieger, supra note 52, at 811 (emphasizing that if confusion is no longer a
necessary element for infringement, rights owners control every commercial and
possibly noncommercial use of the mark).
136. See Cottonwood, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 745 (capturing that the Texas statute expands
the Federal provision by doing away with the fame requirement but that TDRA caused
FTDA to more closely resemble Texas law nonetheless).
137. See id. at 745-47 (noting how little guidance exists from other courts on what
factors to weigh due to the “nebulous conceptual nature” of dilution before reluctantly
accepting its responsibility to provide interpretive guidance and cobbling together a
Frankenstein list of factors using New York State’s six “Sweet” factors, TDRA, and the
likelihood of confusion test).
138. See id. at 743-44 (providing exhaustive definitions and explanations on how a
mark demonstrates distinctiveness either inherently or through acquired secondary
meaning, admitting that “Cash Store” is a descriptive term, and concluding that
Cottonwood’s mark has obtained incontestable status without explaining why).
139. See id. at 730, 740.
140. See id. at 740 (“(1) CSFS is a Canadian corporation; (2) CSFS is not affiliated
with Cottonwood or its “CASH STORE” trade name; and (3) CSFS does not do
business in the United States under the trade name “Cash Store,” and neither owns nor
provides any consumer lending services in the United States.”).
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provided by the T.D.R.A.141 Considering that there are at least twenty-
five states, in addition to the federal government, that have enacted anti-
dilution statutes, the opportunities to disregard the Nation’s international
obligations wholesale increase exponentially.142
By invoking anti-dilution law to block the defendants from using
certain words or phrases both in Visa International143 and Cottonwood,144
courts are creating barriers as envisaged by the W.T.O., although not
perfectly defined into one of the categories created for NTBs.145
Although the defendant in Visa International operated out of Brooklyn at
the time of the suit, he had initially run his business exclusively online
from Japan, making that case relevant for purposes of this discussion.146
The services offered by both defendants in those cases are legitimate
trade as defined after careful analysis of W.T.O panel decisions and
discussion of Art. 41.1 by I.C.T.S.D. and U.N.C.T.A.D.147
Trademark law is quintessentially the balance between free and fair
competition.148 Anti-dilution law, in its current bloated state, stretches
trademark provisions out of proportion and threatens competition and
trade domestically and abroad.149
Observers have long recognized that trademark law enables
141. See id. at 736.
142. See id. at 741.
143. See Visa Int’l Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2010).
144. See Cottonwood, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 761.
145. See Classification of NTMs, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/Trade-Analysis/Non-Tariff-
Measures/NTMs-Classification.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2019) (listing, for example,
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, pre-shipment
inspection and other formalities, non-automatic licensing, quotas, prohibitions and
quantity control, and price control measures).
146. See Visa Int’l Ass’n, 610 F.3d at 1089.
147. See Ruse-Khan,ATrade Agreement Creating Barriers to International Trade, supra note
104, at 697 (reiterating that a normative approach under TRIPS Art. 41 requires
“balancing the interest of title-holders, alleged infringers, and the public interest”).
148. See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION I, supra note 50, at
§ 24:67 (noting that most judges feared that dilution would swallow competition in the
name of trademark protection).
149. See id. at § 24:68 (“[B]ecause every trademark owner wanted . . . ‘the super
weapon’ of an antidilution law, trademark owners induced Congress and the courts to
allow [it]. . . . The statute as interpreted by some courts now bears little resemblance to
its original purpose.”); see also Klieger, supra note 52, at 853 (product differentiation,
enabled by anti-dilution law, erects powerful barriers to entry into a market).
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competition.150 Conversely, trademarks are also capable of creating
barriers to entry.151 These barriers may be economically justified if the
senior mark owner differentiates the product based on tangible attributes
of the product, but when he does not, consumers and new entrants
suffer.152 Enter anti-dilution law, which perpetuates this problem by
affording protection for famous marks because of the junior marks’
effect on the state of mind of the consumer, not confusion or likely
confusion.153
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The first section suggests that interested parties petition the U.S.
Congress to repeal the T.D.R.A. or else implement additional provisions
to make anti-dilution law more uniform across the nation. The second
section recommends that well-known marks in the United States be
given protection in accord with international provisions under the
likelihood of confusion test. The final section suggests that parties bring
requests for consultation against the United States utilizing the D.S.B.
A. WEHAVE A PROBLEM: REPEALING THE T.D.R.A.
First, the U.S. Congress can repeal the federal anti-dilution statute or
otherwise take steps to ensure uniform application of the law across the
nation. It may be too late to ask for a Congressional repeal of the
150. See Klieger, supra note 52, at 854 (“[T]rademarks drive the competitive market
economy as anonymous source and quality indicators.”); see also 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (5th ed.
2019) (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)).
151. See, e.g., Klieger, supra note 52, at 856-58 (discussing persuasive advertising as a
driver for creating product personality, which in turn creates a set of intangible qualities
that consumers associate with the product, leading to product differentiation that
enables brands to charge a premium for their goods).
152. SeeKlieger, supra note 52, at 860 (emphasizing that product differentiation based
on brand personas restricts consumer’s choices and leaves them with fewer purchasing
options).
153. See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION I, supra note 50, at
§ 24:69 (“Dilution by blurring is a state of mind of the ordinary consumer separate and
distinct from the perception which occurs when the consumer is likely to be confused
as to source or affiliation . . . Dilution is a name for a kind of erosion of the strength of
a mark that could occur in the absence of consumer confusion.”).
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T.D.R.A.154 However, stranger things have happened.155 A repeal would
require a representative to introduce a new bill in either house of
Congress, go to committee, survive debates, and win majority votes in
both houses, before going to the president for signature or veto.156
However, proponents for anti-dilution would likely block such a
repeal.157
At the very least, uniformity in the application of anti-dilution law is
necessary to avoid its application to marks that are not famous.158 The
Supreme Court, although it has never defined dilution, has held that the
plaintiff at least has to prove dilution occurred, a requirement not
outlined in the current law as it is written.159
To avoid the hypothetical and speculative tendency of anti-dilution
law, courts must demand concrete evidence or else risk the unnecessary
overprotection of a brand’s image, which in turn creates a problematic
barrier to legitimate trade.160
154. See Farley, supra note 6, at 1187 (stating “the train has already left the station”).
155. See, e.g., Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, H.R. 2965, 111th Cong.
(2010) (passing a landmark federal statute in December 2010 ending a seventeen-year
policy forcing service members in the United States Armed Forces to keep their sexual
orientation secret or else be banned from service).
156. See How Federal Laws are Made, USA.GOV (July 14, 2009),
https://www.usa.gov/how-laws-are-made (outlining the process through which
United States laws are made); see also Schoolhouse Rock!: I’m Just a Bill (ABC television
broadcast Mar. 27, 1976) (illustrating the method for enacting a law in a manner
intended to be understood by all ages).
157. See, e.g., What is Dilution? INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION
https://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/Dilution.aspx (last visited July 14, 2019)
(stating that INTA, a global association of more than 7,200 organizations comprised of
brand owners and professionals dedicated to supporting trademarks and related
intellectual property (IP), supports efforts to protect famous marks from diluting uses
that either blur the mark’s distinctiveness or tarnish its reputation); see also Farley, supra
note 6, at 1177 (quoting a judge speaking to a trademark owner’s attorney, “boy, you
must have some lobby to get a law like that passed.”).
158. See, e.g., Cottonwood Fin. Ltd. v. Cash Store Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 726, 742
(N.D. Tex. 2011) (applying Texas law to find a dilution claim on a mark that is not
famous).
159. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (“Whatever difficulties
of proof may be entailed, they are not an acceptable reason for dispensing with
proof[.]”); see also MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION I, supra note
50, § 24:67 (“[T]he gist of the U.S. federal anti-dilution law is all about looking to
probable dilutive damage or injury to the plaintiff’s famous mark.”).
160. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark has been Diluted: Theories or Facts? 41
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B. INTERNATIONALLYWELL-KNOWN: PROPERLY PROTECTED
WELL-KNOWNMARKSONLY REQUIRE A LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION TEST
Second, the United States can take measures to protect well-known
marks in accord with international provisions under the likelihood of
confusion test, obviating the need for an anti-dilution law. Not only is
the likelihood of confusion test tried and true, but it is also minimally
invasive.161 The test usually consists of some variation of the factors used
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats162 to
include (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity
of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels
used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by
the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8)
likelihood of expansion of the product lines.163
When a brand has invested the time and money into its trademark, all
it needs to protect itself against infringement is the likelihood of
confusion test regardless of whether or not the goods are related.164
Indeed, the United States need only bolster protection for famous marks
in accord with international treaties to obviate the need for anti-dilution
HOUSTON L. REV. 713, 742 (2006) (advocating for the use of expert testimony and
survey evidence versus the fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark
with the famous mark); see also Klieger, supra note 52, at 862-63 (suggesting that new
entrants would face “tremendous obstacles” due to product differentiation and
consumer allegiance fostered by the “overinvestment in the cultivation of brand
imagery”).
161. See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION I, supra note 50, §
23:1 (calling the test “fundamental” and the “keystone of . . . trademark infringement”);
see also Klieger, supra note 52, at 861 (“[The] test’s direct restraint of free competition is
exceedingly minor.”).
162. 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 2003).
163. See id. at 348-49 (noting, interestingly, that the factors are necessary to evaluate
“[w]hen the goods are related, but not competitive,” because on the contrary, “[i]f the
goods are totally unrelated, there can be no infringement because confusion is
unlikely”).
164. SeeKlieger, supra note 52, at 861-62 (emphasizing that protecting the persuasive
function of trademark as an incident of prevention of consumer confusion is a far cry
from expanding protection for famous marks); see also Farley, supra note 6, at 1181
(“Query whether Microsoft would win a trademark infringement case against a
defendant selling “Microsoft Cola”? Microsoft would most probably be successful and
it would not need dilution law to succeed.”).
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law.165
C. THIS ISNOT A TEST: REQUESTS FOR CONSULTATION FOR
T.R.I.P.S. ARTICLE 41
Finally, parties may bring action against the United States for violation
of Art. 41.1 of T.R.I.P.S. utilizing the D.S.B. The Marrakesh Agreement
carried with it many firsts for members of the newly created W.T.O. In
addition to developing a regulatory framework for world trade, the
D.S.B. created a structured in-house legal dispute mechanism for
members.166 Indeed, since its inception in 1995, members have brought
over 500 disputes, and panels have issued 350 rulings.167 Forty-one of
those disputes involved some provision of T.R.I.P.S.168
When a member violates trade promises it made through the signing
of the W.T.O.’s agreements, another member may submit a request for
consultation to the W.T.O., with third parties joining if they have an
interest in the case.169 If the parties cannot reach agreement after sixty
days of consultations, a panel is established and has ninety days to
examine the case and issue its report.170
This streamlined dispute settlement mechanism is an improvement
165. See Farley, supra note 6, at 1181 (citing the Paris Convention and TRIPS call for
protection of famous or well-known marks where the use would result in a likelihood
of confusion).
166. See, e.g., Is the WTO Losing Its Relevance? INTERNATIONAL POLICY DIGEST
https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/06/30/is-the-wto-losing-its-relevance/ (last visited
July 15, 2019) (explaining the various systems and bodies established concurrently with
the WTO).
167. Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited July 17,
2019).
168. Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm
(last visited July 15, 2019).
169. See Principles: Equitable, Fast, Effective,
Mutually Acceptable, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited July
15, 2019) (noting the reasons behind the dispute system and the methods for WTO
members to bring a suit).
170. See The Panel Process, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm (last visited July
15, 2019) (illustrating the process of a WTO dispute from initial consultations through
to retaliation).
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from its pre-Marrakesh vintage in that it introduced structure to the
dispute settlement process.171 Notably, the Uruguay Round also
introduced an Appellate Body which can uphold, modify, or reverse legal
findings of a panel.172 However, observers hotly debate the efficiency of
the Appellate Body, and its future is currently in flux.173
Article 41.1 of T.R.I.P.S. nearly had its coming of age moment in
2010.174 Unlike most cases to invoke Art. 41, which generally focus on
the lack of protection and enforcement of T.R.I.P.S.’ minimum
standards, this case would have allowed the W.T.O. to rule on T.R.I.P.S.-
plus provisions pervasive in the I.P. laws of independent nations.175
Although the parties settled the dispute outside of the D.S.B., had the
case gone to the panel, it may well have found the questioned provisions
in violation of T.R.I.P.S.176
Anti-dilution law, through its heavy emphasis on the persuasive value
of a mark without necessarily protecting the source and quality of a mark,
broadens trademark protections to the point of creating a barrier on
legitimate trade.177 The issue is ripe to challenge as anathema to more
significant U.S. obligations to the liberalization of trade as a member of
171. See Principles: Equitable, Fast, Effective, Mutually Acceptable, supra note 169 (noting
fixed timelines, requirements for compliance with rulings, and greater discipline for the
length of time a panel should settle a case).
172. See Appellate Body, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last visited
July 15, 2019) (outlining the responsibilities of the Appellate Body).
173. See WTO Appeals Body Heading Toward Temporary Collapse: EU Trade Chief,
REUTERS (July 16, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g7-economy-
malmstrom/wto-appeals-body-heading-toward-temporary-collapse-eu-trade-chief-
idUSKCN1UB1CM?il=0.
174. See Request for Consultations by India, supra note 48 (requesting consultations
regarding generic medicine seizure as an overprotection measure creating barriers to
legitimate trade pursuant to TRIPS Article 41.1); see also Request for Consultations by
Brazil, Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, supra note 94 (requesting the WTO review
generic medicine seizure as an overprotection measure creating barriers to legitimate
trade pursuant to Article 41.1).
175. See Ruse-Khan,ATrade Agreement Creating Barriers to International Trade, supra note
104, at 655 (noting that this is a novel issue for a WTO dispute).
176. See id. at 660 (noting that the VCLT guide to interpreting treaties calls for
including the preamble, annexes, and reiterating member countries’ agreements in the
Doha Declaration).
177. See Klieger, supra note 52, at 863 (commenting on the anti-competitive effects
of dilution protection where dilution laws only target the persuasive value of a mark).
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the W.T.O.
V. CONCLUSION
As a member of the W.T.O., the United States is responsible for
meeting the obligations it agreed to under the Marrakesh Agreement and
all of its annexes.178 These obligations include eliminating barriers to
legitimate trade in the form of expansive trademark protection.179
By repealing the T.D.R.A. and incorporating proper protection for
well-known marks, the United States can avoid further consternation in
the D.S.B. should another member state bring a request for consultation
under T.R.I.P.S. Art. 41.180
Because the United States signed the Marrakesh Agreement and
doubled down on its commitment to accelerate economic growth
through the promotion of free trade, it is bound by T.R.I.P.S. to both
provide protection for owners of I.P. and ensure that this protection
does not create legitimate barriers to trade.181
Therefore, the introduction of the T.D.R.A., which broadly expanded
the rights conferred on owners of well-known marks, and the subsequent
application of the anti-dilution law, is antithetical to the nation’s broader
trade liberalization objectives in violation of T.R.I.P.S. Art. 41.1.182
The two cases discussed exemplify the rise of the federal anti-dilution
law in the United States and its departure from its original intent through
demonstrable inconsistency in the application of the anti-dilution
provision.183 Anti-dilution law creates barriers to entry without justifiably
protecting trademarks.184
The United States has many obligations as a member of the W.T.O.,185
not the least of which is T.R.I.P.S. Art. 41.1, a legally binding provision
in a signed treaty that echoes the mission of the W.T.O. as a whole:
178. See supra at Part III(A).
179. See supra at Part III(A).
180. See supra at Part IV.
181. See supra at Part III(A).
182. See supra at Part II.
183. See supra at Part II(D).
184. See supra at Part III(C).
185. See supra at Part II(A).
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elimination of barriers to trade.186 The U.S. anti-dilution law violates
T.R.I.P.S. Art. 41.1 by creating an NTB through the unnecessary
expansion of protection for well-known marks.187
If the United States does not square anti-dilution law with
international obligations either by (1) repealing the federal anti-dilution
statute or otherwise taking steps to ensure uniform application of the law
across the nation, (2) taking measures to protect well-known marks in
accord with international provisions under the likelihood of confusion
test, obviating the need for an anti-dilution law, then (3) parties may and
should bring action against the United States for violation of Art. 41.1 of
T.R.I.P.S. utilizing the D.S.B.188
186. See supra at Part II(B).
187. See supra at Part III(C).
188. See supra at Part IV.
